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Bilello: Judicial Review and Soldiers' Rights: Is the Principle of Deferen

NOTE

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOLDIERS' RIGHTS:
IS THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFERENCE A
STANDARD OF REVIEW?
INTRODUCTION

Since 1974,1 members of the armed forces have called upon the
2
Supreme Court to decide whether various military regulations vio3
late their constitutionally protected rights. Although expressed in
various forms, the Supreme Court's fundamental response to these
constitutional challenges is generally referred to as the "principle of
deference." 4 As articulated by the Court, the principle of deference
is a circumscribed form of judicial review5 in which the balance
reached by the political branches of government regarding military
necessity and servicemembers' rights is afforded a heightened degree
of respect.' At its core, the Court's deference is motivated by its be1. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (involving an Army captain's constitutional
challenge to several provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), discussed infra notes
107-20 and accompanying text.
2. The Supreme Court has applied the same degree of deference regardless of whether
the constitutional challenge was to a congressional statute or an armed forces regulation. Compare Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding a congressional statute that exempted females from registering for the draft) with Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986) (upholding an air force dress regulation). One commentator has argued for heightened
deference when congressional rather than armed forces regulations are challenged. See
Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional
Rights, 62 N.C.L. REv. 177, 247-48 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296 (1983); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
(1980); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 24 (1976); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975).
4. See, e.g., Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 70 (stating that "judicial deference . . . is at its
apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies
and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.").
5. But see infra notes 102-52 and accompanying text (questioning whether the principle
"ofdeference is in fact a standard of review).
6. See Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 2931 (1987) (stating that "we have
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lief that the sensitive weighing of competing military interests is constitutionally' and functionally 8 more amenable to political, rather
than judicial, resolution. 9
Whether labeled the "separate community" doctrine,1 0 the doctrine of "military necessity,"'" or the principle of deference, 2 the
effect of the Court's military jurisprudence for members of the
armed forces asserting constitutional violations is the same-the
likelihood of success on the merits, given the significantly limited
form of "review," is quite remote. Indeed, through the 1987 term,
the Supreme Court has upheld every challenged regulation."
In each of these cases, the Court has routinely asserted that in-

dividuals do not lose the protections of the Bill of Rights upon entry
adhered to this principle of deference in a variety of contexts where, as here, the constitutional
rights of servicemen were implicated.").
7. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional basis for
the principle of deference).
8. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text (discussing the pragmatic considerations that have been expressed in support of the principle of deference).
9. In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), then-Chief Justice Burger noted that
"'[t]he military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from
that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to
interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in
judicial matters.'" Id. at 301 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953) (Jack-

son, J.)).
10.

See Hirschhorn, supra note 2, at 178.

I1. See Levine, The Doctrine of Military Necessity in the Federal Courts, 89 MIL. L.
REv. 3 (1980); Note, Goldman v. Secretary of Defense: Restricting the Religious Rights of
Military Servicemembers, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 881, 897 (1985) (authored by Stephen Lewis
Rabinowitz).
12. See Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 2931 (1987). This Note employs the
term "principle of deference" since it is believed that this phrase most accurately describes the
Supreme Court's method for reviewing constitutional claims of members of the armed forces.
13. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that an Air Force regulation that had the effect of preventing plaintiff from wearing a yarmulke while on duty did
not violate the first amendment); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding that a
congressional statute requiring males, but not females, to register for the draft did not violate
plaintiff's right to equal protection of the laws); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (holding that an Air Force regulation requiring the prior approval of commanding officers before
soldiers could distribute petitions on an Air Force base did not violate the first amendment);
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (holding that a congressional statute permitting a
summary court martial to try servicemen without the assistance of counsel did not violate the
sixth amendment); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (concluding that a congressional statute subjecting males, but not females, to mandatory discharge for failing to be promoted for a second time did not violate plaintiff's right to equal protection of the laws); Parker
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (holding that a congressional statute which had the effect of
prohibiting petititoner from making statements criticizing the American role in Vietnam did
not violate the first amendment).
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into the armed forces.' 4 Nonetheless, the scope of those protections,

the Court reasons, is narrower, because of the military's "fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline ....

",i

The Court has failed, however, to translate

this principle of deference into a consistent standard of review that
clearly and precisely delineates what servicemembers must prove to

establish a viable constitutional claim.' 6 The absence of such a standard of review, in addition to the Court's unwillingness to invalidate
any of the challenged regulations, raises a significant question as to
whether a majority of the Supreme Court has tacitly concluded that
of the Bill of Rights for the duservicemembers lose the protections
17
ration of their military service.
Several commentators, while not expressly addressing this issue,
have suggested that the Court's deferential approach in these cases
reflects a general insensitivity to civil liberties and constitutes an unjustifiable abdication of the judicial function.'" This Note argues, by

14. See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507; Goldberg,453 U.S. at 66; Glines, 444 U.S. at
354; Henry, 425 U.S. at 44, 48; Ballard, 419 U.S. at 507; Levy, 417 U.S. at 758; cf. Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (stating that "[w]hile the members of the military are not
excluded from the protection[s] granted by the First Amendment, the different character of
the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those
protections.").
15. Levy, 417 U.S. at 758.
16. The need for clarity in articulating a standard of review is fundamental to the
development of a rational and principled body of constitutional law. Without the expression of
a discernible standard, there is nothing to prevent individual judges from deciding constitutional questions on wholly arbitrary and subjective bases. As Justice Douglas once observed,
"One who need not explain the reasons for his actions can operate beyond the law." Spady v.
Mount Vernon Hous. Auth., 419 U.S. 983, 985 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
This is not to suggest that the expression of a standard of review necessarily guarantees
the principled development of law. Certainly, mere words can be shaped and manipulated to
achieve arbitrary results. As Justice Stevens has noted, how a court expresses a standard of
review is less important than "the actual showing that the court demands of the State in order
to uphold the regulation." Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2267 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, a decipherable intellectual framework for judicial analysis is an essential
starting point for the creation of a rational system of constitutional law.
17. See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and
Other "Special Contexts," 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 819 (1988) (arguing that "first amendment
values in the military context should not be casually dismissed or intentionally denigrated by
sweeping invocations of judicial deference."); Note, First Amendment Rights of Military Personnel: Denying Rights to Those Who Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 855, 865 (1987)
(authored by Linda Sugin) [hereinafter Note, First Amendment Rights] (commenting that
"[a] review of the development of first amendment law for the military shows that what began
as a weak but substantive review has degenerated into virtually no review at all."); Note,
Goldman v. Weinberger: Deference or Abdication?, 7 PAcE L.REV. 531, 557 (1987) (authored
by Susan Anisfield Vallario) [hereinafter Note, Deference or Abdication?] (criticizing the Su-
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contrast, that the fundamental inadequacy of the Court's military
jurisprudence is not necessarily its deferential perspective; rather, in
its failure to provide any meaningful guidance to servicemembers,
the lower federal courts, and the bar,19 the Supreme Court has failed
to substantiate its basic assumption that members of the armed
forces are protected by the Bill of Rights.2
I.

THE CONSTITUTION, THE MILITARY, AND SOLDIERS' RIGHTS

A.

The Standing Army in Early American Society

Since the early colonial period in American history, the military
establishment has occupied an often controversial position within our
legal environment. 1 Perhaps no other values were as deeply embedded in the core of early American society as the inherent suspicion
of, and the profound hatred for, the peacetime standing army. 2 This
deep-seated distrust of the military was essentially a product of the
commonly held perception that a standing army could not be restrained by the limits of the legal system and would thus be likely to
abuse its authority with impunity, to the detriment of the local
populace.2 3
preme Court's majority decision in Goldman because it "creates a single inescapable conclusion: the standard to be applied to individual rights challenges in the military context will
henceforth be one of absolute deference."); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
515 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (commenting that "[t]oday the Court eschews its constitutionally mandated role."); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 112 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the Court substitutes hollow shibboleths about 'deference to legislative
decisions' for constitutional analysis.").
19. See infra notes 102-52 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
21. See generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 61-63, 112-19 (1967) (discussing the colonists' fear and hatred of standing armies); M.
CUNLIFFE, SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE MARTIAL SPIRIT IN AMERICA 37-49 (1968) (discussing colonial attitudes toward a standing army); R. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 113 (1975) (describing the colonial military heritage); R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES ARMY 74-94 (1967) (describing the evolution of the colonial military heritage); Warren, The Dangers of Standing Armies, in THE MILITARY IN AMERICA: FROM THE COLONIAL
ERA TO THE PRESENT 21-23 (P. Karsten ed. 1980) (presenting a contemporaneous colonial
argument against standing armies).
22. R. KOHN, supra note 21, at 2-6. This view of the military establishment was not
unique to early Americans, but was essentially a product of a rich body of seventeenth century
British political thought, which had provided the intellectual foundation for the parliamentary
revolution in 1689. See L. SCHWOERER, "No STANDING ARMIES!": THE ANTIARMY IDEOLOGY
IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 188-201 (1974).
23. The speech delivered by Dr. Joseph Warren on March 5, 1772, at a ceremony commemorating the Boston Massacre is representative of early American views on the military:
The ruinous consequences of standing armies to free communities may be seen in
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Closely linked to the colonists' hatred of the standing army was
the early American faith in the virtues of the local militia. 4 This
trust was due, in part, to the influence of British political thought,2 5
and in part, to the practical limitations that a sparse population imposed on the size and structure of a military unit. 6 Since a militia
was comprised of civilians rather than professional soldiers, some
early Americans argued that the members of this "fighting force"
would act vigilantly to protect the rights of their fellow civilians. 7
As the American Revolution approached, the clear symbolism between the liberty-enhancing militia and the liberty-infringing standing army became one of the many rallying cries for separation from
Great Britain.28
This same debate between the evils of the standing army and
the virtues of the local militia that exemplified the broader political
struggle with Great Britain continued after Independence as a microcosm of the more basic tension between competing visions of how
to build the nation.2 9 In the early years of the Republic, the bias
the histories of Syracuse, Rome, and many other once flourishing States; some of
which have now scarce a name! Their baneful influence is most suddenly felt, when
they are placed in populous cities; for, by a corruption of morals, the public happiness is immediately affected; and that this is one of the effects of quartering troops
in a populous city, is a truth, to which many a mourning parent, many a lost, despairing child in this metropolis, must bear a very melancholy testimony....
[Soldiers] are instructed implicitly to obey their commanders, without enquiring
into the justice of the cause they are engaged to support: Hence it is, that they are
ever to be dreaded as the ready engines of tyranny and oppression.
Warren, supra note 21, at 21 (emphasis in original).
24. See R. KOHN, supra note 21, at 7-9.
25. According to one contemporary British writer, "[tihere can be no danger where the
Nobility and Chief gentry of England are the Commanders, and the Body [is] made up of the
Freeholders, their Sons and Servants." Id. at 8 (emphasis in original).
26. Id.; see also R. WIEGLEY, supra note 21, at 79-80 (discussing the economic basis for
the creation of colonial militias).
27. See B. BAILYN, supra note 21, at 84; R. KOHN, supra note 21, at 7-9.
28. R. KoHN, supra note 21, at 8-9. The "abuses and usurpations" allegedly perpetrated
by the British King that are outlined in the Declaration of Independence include the following:
He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies, without the Consent of our legislatures.
He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil
power.
For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:He is, at this time, transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny ....
The Declaration of Independence paras. 13-27 (U.S. 1776).
29. Some early American leaders, such as George Washington, Robert Morris, and Al-
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against the standing army, and the general aversion towards a strong
central government, were too entrenched to permit anything approaching a national military establishment.3 Instead, Congress,
under the Articles of Confederation, created a small piecemeal force
that proved incapable of meeting the new nation's military needs."'
Shay's Rebellion in 1787, in which a group of disgruntled Massachusetts farmers forcefully prevented farm foreclosures by the local
courts, highlighted the "military impotence" of the Confederation
and the general inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation to provide even the rudiments of national cohesion.3"
The Framers of the Constitution bore the responsibility of
reconciling the tension between the need for a national military force
that could maintain internal order and prevent foreign domination
and the long tradition of bitter opposition to the peacetime standing
army. 33 They accomplished this by granting Congress clear authority
to create and maintain a peacetime military force, 34 wresting primary control of the military from the executive branch and placing
it in the hands of the national legislature, 85 limiting military approexander Hamilton, believed that the rhetoric against a national military establishment was
appropriate when used to focus the public's attention on the abuses of Great Britain, but that
ultimately, a peacetime national military force was indispensable to the continued sovereign
existence of the United States. R. KOHN, supra note 21, at 49-53. These leaders believed that
a unified national military establishment was a necessary predicate to the creation of the
strong central government that they hoped would emerge in post-Revolutionary America. Id.
Others, like Elbridge Gerry, argued that the socially pernicious aspects of maintaining a
peacetime military establishment were not eliminated merely because independence had been
realized. Id. at 52-53. On the contrary, Gerry contended that the surest way to unravel the
victories of the Revolution would be to create a powerful national government and a peacetime
military establishment. Id. at 53.
30. Id. at 13.
31. See id. at 54-72.
32. Id. at 74-75.
33. Despite the Confederation's clearly inadequate military policy, not all leaders at the
time of the Constitutional Convention had overcome their distrust of the standing army. Patrick Henry, for example, warned against the dangers of centralized military power:
"Congress, by the power of taxation, by that of raising an army, and by their control over the militia, have the sword in one hand and the purse in the other. Shall we
be safe without either? Congress have an unlimited power over both; they are entirely given up by us. Let him candidly tell me where and when did freedom exist
when the sword and the purse were given up from the people? Unless a miracle in
human affairs interposed, no nation ever retained its liberty after the loss of the
sword and the purse. Can you prove, by any argumentative deduction, that it is
possible to be safe without retaining one of these? If you give them up you are
gone."
L. SMITH, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER 27 (1951).
34. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 24-26 (A. Hamilton).

35.

U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Of course, the executive branch of government under
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priations to two year periods,36 and nationalizing the state militias. 37
In this manner, the Framers enabled the American military establishment to bridge the gap from an instrument of autocracy to a
carefully restrained tool of a sovereign democratic nation.38
B.

ConstitutionalAmbiguities

The Constitution expressly provides that within our structure of
government it is the legislature that governs and regulates the mili-

tary, thereby preventing the military from forcibly dominating civilian government.39 What the Constitution does not make clear, however, is the extent to which the Bill of Rights restricts Congress

when it exercises its regulatory authority over the armed forces. To
this question neither the Constitution nor other historical evidence
provides adequate guidance.40 The dearth of constitutional or historithe Constitution is not without military power. See generally L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 230-38 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the scope of presidential power as commanderin-chief). Indeed, Article 11, § 2, states that "[tlhe President shall be Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual service of the United States ....
" U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. According to
Alexander Hamilton, the president's authority as commander-in-chief:
would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces as first General and admiral of
the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and
to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies,--all of which, by the Constitution
under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 430-31 (A. Hamilton) (H.C. Lodge ed. 1902) (emphasis in original). Notwithstanding this limited conception of presidential military authority, "[o]ur military history ... is replete with instances of executively ordained uses of military force abroad
in the absence of prior congressional approval." L. TRIBE. supra, § 4-7, at 231.
36. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 12; see THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (A. Hamilton).
37. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 15-16; see THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (A. Hamilton).
38. See R. KOHN, supra note 21, at 86.
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. As one commentator noted:
Theoretically there was-and is-no way the military can take over the government
without destroying the ability of that government to function. The government cannot be taken over, only replaced, and all legitimate instruments of authority rendered inoperative. As long as the Constitution exists, and is accepted, and any of the
institutions through which it works-Congress, the courts, and the executive
-function normally, no army can take over the United States.
R KOHN, supra note 21, at 81 (emphasis added). But cf. id. (observing that "neither the
Constitution nor its authors provided adequate answers" to such questions as whether, in the
absence of normal operations of government, the military could "infiltrate the process by
which public policy was made, or ... openly negotiate its willingness to protect the nation[.]").
40. But see Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice II, 72
HARV. L. REV. 266, 301-02 (1958) (concluding that while the Framers did not originally intend to extend Bill of Rights protections to members of the armed forces, this same conclusion
is not necessarily warranted in modern society).
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cal insight into this problem is not surprising given that the Framers
were more concerned with justifying the very existence of a national
military force to an anti-militaristic society than with the rights of
soldiers.4 ' Thus, it is unlikely that the Framers ever considered
whether members of the armed forces are protected by the Bill of
Rights.
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that
"[t]he Congress shall have power... [t]o raise and support armies.
. .[and] [t]o make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces ...."" Alexander Hamilton, writing in Feder-

alist No. 23, apparently envisioned no restrictions on the legislative
military authority:
These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of nationalexigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which
may be necessary to satisfy them....
[I]t must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that
there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for
the defence and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy-that is, in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the National Forces."
While the Supreme Court has never interpreted this power to be

boundless," it has on numerous occasions acknowledged the broad
41.

See supra notes 21-38 and accompanying text (discussing perceptions of the military

in early American society); see also 2 THE

RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787,

at 329 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (noting that Elbridge Gerry, delegate from Massachusetts,
"thought an army dangerous in time of peace [and] could never consent to a power to keep up
an indefinite number [and] proposed that there shall not be kept up in time of peace more than
[two or three] thousand troops.").
42. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cls. 12, 14.
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 136-37 (A. Hamilton) (H.C. Lodge ed. 1902) (emphasis
in original).
44. See, e.g., McElroy v. United States ex reL Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (holding that courts martial lack jurisdiction over civilian military employees in non-capital cases);
Kinsella v. United States ex reL Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (holding that courts martial
may not try dependents of members of the armed forces located in foreign countries in noncapital cases); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that courts martial in peacetime
lack jurisdiction over dependents of members of the armed forces located in foreign countries
in capital cases); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (holding that
courts martial may not try discharged veterans for alleged crimes committed during active
service); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (holding that courts martial may not
try civilians where civil courts are open and their process unobstructed by foreign invasion or
civil insurrection).
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scope of this power by characterizing it as plenary.45 In Chappell v.

Wallace,46 for example, the Supreme Court stated, "It is clear that
the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have ple-

nary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework
of the Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and
remedies related to military discipline; and Congress and the Courts
have acted in conformity with that view." 47 The difficulty with the
Court's characterization, however, is that it suggests that it is Congress, rather than the judiciary, that has the ultimate word on the
extent of servicemembers' constitutional rights. Such an interpretation, however, is not only contrary to the Court's basic assumption
that soldiers retain Bill of Rights protections, 8 it is also inconsistent
with the doctrine of judicial review.49
45. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (stating that "[i]t would be
difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by
the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly responsible-as the judicial branch
is not-to the electoral process."); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953) (concluding that "judges are not given the task of running the Army" and that "[t]he responsibility for
setting up channels through which . .. grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests
upon the Congress and upon the President of the United States and his subordinates.").
46. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
47. Id. at 301. On the other hand, the only indication in the text of the Bill of Rights
that would suggest that the rights of soldiers may not be coextensive with the rights of civilians
is contained in the fifth amendment, which excepts "cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger," from the
prosecutorial requirement of indictment by grand jury. US. CONST. amend. V. The remaining
amendments, however, contain no further exceptions and thus seemingly apply in full force to
servicemembers.
48. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
49. The principle of judicial review is deeply engrained in American jurisprudence despite scholarly debate over its theoretical justifications. See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 82 (2d ed.
1973) (questioning the appropriateness of judicial review by asking "why should [the Court]
not, in all cases... accept the determination of Congress and the President ... that a statute
is duly authorized by the Constitution?"); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 12 (1962) (arguing that the principle of judicial
review can only be "'supposed' and that the 'phraseology of the Constitution' itself neither
supports nor disavows it."); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
LECTURES, 1958, at 10-11 (1958) (stating that "[t]here was nothing in the United States Constitution that gave courts any authority to review the decisions of Congress ....
[but] there
were other reasons, not only proper but essential, for inferring such a power in the Constitution
... .");L. TRIBE, supra note 35, § 3-2, at 25 (noting that "[t]he premise of a written Constitution would not be disserved, and legislative power would not necessarily be unbounded, if Congress itself judged the constitutionality of its enactments."). Since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(I Cranch) 137 (1803), litigants have relied upon the federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to delineate the outer boundaries of permissible governmental conduct, so as to
preserve both the fundamental structure of government erected by the Framers and those personal liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights.
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Consequently, an unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable, tension
exists between the seemingly "plenary" congressional power to regu-

late the armed forces and the extent to which the Bill of Rights acts
to limit that power. The remainder of this Note examines the Supreme Court's attempted reconciliation of this tension5 0 and argues
that the Court has failed to articulate and apply a clear standard of
review which incorporates the principle of deference while maintaining some room for the judicial protection of servicemembers'
rights.51
II.
A.

DEFERENCE IN PERSPECTIVE

Theoretical Bases for Deference

The Supreme Court has never claimed that military rules and
regulations enacted by either Congress or one of the armed services
are immune from judicial scrutiny.52 In fact, the Court has been
quite sensitive to the charge that the principle of deference is merely
a euphemism for the abdication of the judicial role. 3 Similarly, the
Court has not attempted to evade the necessity of addressing the
constitutional issues presented by invoking the political question doctrine. 54 Nor has the Court ever purported to argue that Bill of
50. See infra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 102-59 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1983) (stating that "[t]his
Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress
in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service."); Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (commenting that "Congress is [not] free to disregard the
Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs."); cf. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986) (noting that while the Court will review constitutional claims of servicemembers, it "must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities
concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest."); Brown v. Glines, 444
U.S. 348, 357 (1980) (reviewing Glines' constitutional challenge but concluding that "the military must possess substantial discretion over its internal discipline.").
53. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (stating that "[w]e of course
do not abdicate our ultimate responsibility to decide the constitutional question, but simply
recognize that the Constitution itself requires such deference to congressional choice."). But
see Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 370 (1980) (Brennan, J.,dissenting) (contending that the
majority had "abdicate[d] its responsibility to safeguard free expression when it reflexively
bow[ed] before the shibboleth of military necessity."); cf Note, Deference or Abdication?,
supra note 18, at 557 (arguing that the Court in Goldman "implicitly abdicated its role as
arbiter of the Constitution for future cases arising in the military context.").
54. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962) (discussing the political
question doctrine). Although the underlying rationale for the political question doctrine has
been subjected to varying interpretations, see, e.g., Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term-Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 74-79 (1961); Champlin &
Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOF-
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Rights protections are wholly inapplicable to members of the armed
forces.5
On the contrary, the Court has justified its "healthy deference
to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs" ' on the following bases: first, the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers mandates such deference; 57 second, the unique
nature of the military establishment within our governmental structure requires a narrow judicial role;58 third, the inherent inability of
the judicial system to competently scrutinize the competing military
interests renders full scale judicial review inappropriate; 9 and finally, the potential costs of an erroneous judicial balance necessitate
strict judicial deference. 60
1. Constitutional Deference.- The text of Article I, section 8
grants to Congress the broad authority to create rules and regulations for the military without any apparent limitation. 1 As a majority of the Court construes the doctrine of separation of powers, Congress' "plenary" power in this context is inferentially a constraint on
STRA L. REV. 215 (1985); Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J.

597 (1976); Redish, Judicial Review and the "PoliticalQuestion," 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031
(1985); Weehsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-9
(1959), the essence of the political question doctrine is that certain constitutional questions are
best resolved by the political branches of government rather than the judiciary. See Redish,
supra, at 1031.
In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Justice Brennan outlined the several categories of
political questions:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
One commentator has argued that the Supreme Court's military jurisprudence represents
a de facto invocation of the political question doctrine. See Dienes, supra note 18, at 819-23.
55. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
56. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 66.
57. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
61. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 14. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton corroborated
the seemingly boundless nature of this power. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 136-37 (A.
Hamilton) (H.C. Lodge ed. 1902), quoted supra text accompanying note 43.
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the exercise of judicial power." Thus, even though the limited judicial role is not made explicit in the text of the Constitution, a majority of the Court contends that an over-intrusive judicial role in this
context would constitute an unjustified encroachment upon an inherently legislative function."3
2. Separate Community.- Prior to the 1981 case of Rostker v.
Goldberg,6 4 the constitutional dimensions of the principle of deference were always lurking on the periphery of the Court's analysis
but never expressly articulated as such. Instead, the principle of deference was invoked essentially as a response to the perceived uniqueness of the armed forces within our governmental structure. In
Parkerv. Levy, 65 Justice Rehnquist expressed the often quoted functional justification for judicial deference:
This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society. We have also recognized that the military has, again by necessity, developed laws
and traditions of its own during its long history. The differences
between the military and civilian communities result from the fact
that "it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be
ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.""6
The legal consequence of the military's unique mission is that
governmental action which might otherwise infringe upon a constitutionally protected interest if undertaken in a civilian context may be
deemed constitutional in the military context because "there is simply not the same autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community."'6 7 Consequently, the narrower form of judicial review invoked
when servicemembers assert constitutional claims is a function of the
narrower rights generally afforded to members of the military.
3. Limits of the Judicial Process.- The third rationale for deference, as articulated by the Court, is that the judiciary lacks competence to deal effectively with the complex military and national
defense issues raised by these cases.68 In a speech given at the New
62. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983).
63. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58 (1981) (stating that "[in deciding the
question before us we must be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is
desirable for that of Congress, or our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation
by the Legislative Branch.").
64. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
65. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
66. Id. at 743 (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)).
67. Id. at 751.
68. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). The Court in Gilligan noted:
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York Law Center in 1962, then-Chief Justice Earl Warren captured
the essence of this incapacity aspect of the principle of deference
when he stated that "courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact
upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority
might have. Many of the problems of the military society are, in a
sense, alien to the problems with which the judiciary is trained to
deal." 9 As a consequence, the scope of review, the Court argues,
must be narrowed to reflect this inability of the judiciary to master
the complexities of military adjudication."0
4. Cost of Judicial Error.- Finally, one commentator has argued that the fundamental incompetence of the judiciary in this field
stems not from a lack of expertise but from the costs of judicial error.7 1 He argues that unlike other areas of the law in which the judiciary is called upon to exercise its judicial review function, an erroneous judicial invalidation of a challenged military regulation may
have catastrophic consequences for national defense.72 The judiciary's interference on the side of the servicemember may at some
level so hinder military effectiveness that "[a] t the worst, it permits
the imposition of the will of another state on the United States." '
From this perspective, the principle of deference acts as a safeguard
against potentially injurious judicial intermeddling.
B. Deference Challenged
From the first articulation of the principle of deference in
Parker v. Levy,7 5 to its most recent exposition in Goldman v. Weinberger,6 the doctrine has been vehemently criticized by members of
the Court77 and commentators78 as both a denigration of Bill of
It is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts
have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and

Executive Branches.
Id. (emphasis in original).
69.
70.
71.
72.

Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L.
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983).
Hirschhorn, supra note 2, at 237-40.
Id.

REV.

181, 187 (1962).

73. Id. at 238.
74. See id.

75. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
76. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
77. See, e.g., id. at 513-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's deference to unsubstantiated assertions of military necessity was an unconstitutional abdication of
the Court's judicial function as "protector of individual liberties"); id. at 525 (Blackmun, J.,
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Rights values and an unjustifiable relinquishment of the judicial
function. The focus of this opposition has been the underlying theories posited for the principle of deference, 9 which critics challenge
as conceptually weak and unpersuasive8 0
First, critics have challenged the Court's core premise that deference is mandated by the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers. 81 Indeed, critics argue that the principle of deference undermines, rather than advances, the theory of separation of powers. 2
Since Marbury v. Madison," it has been the function of the judiciary and not the political branches to delimit the bounds of permissible governmental conduct and the scope of constitutionally protected
rights.8 The principle of deference, however, is diametrically opposed to this tradition. 5 As a consequence, critics argue that the
principle of deference does not reflect a heightened respect for the
political branches of government, but rather, a clear abdication of
the traditional judicial function.8
Moreover, while critics acknowledge that it is Congress that has
taken the initiative during this century in moving the military closer
dissenting) (stating that "military personnel do not forfeit their constitutional rights as a price
of enlistment."); id. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (commenting that deference to asserted
military judgments is not warranted where such assertions are contradicted and "do not on the
scales of justice bear a similarly disproportionate weight to [the first amendment rights] of the
individual."); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 368-69 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[aill that the Court offers . . . is a series of platitudes about the special nature and
overwhelming importance of military necessity.... [b]ut the concept of military necessity is
seductively broad, and has a dangerous plasticity.").
78. See, e.g., Dienes, supra note 18, at 784-85 (criticizing the Court's "sweeping deference" to regulations affecting the military).
79. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
80. As one commentator who supports strict judicial deference in the military context
has observed, "Because the majority's premises have been asserted rather than explained, the
distinct, less assertive standard of review provided under the separate community doctrine has
been vulnerable to criticism." Hirschhorn, supra note 2, at 203-04.
81. See, e.g., Dienes, supra note 18, at 822 (accepting "judicial recognition of the broad
constitutional powers of the Congress and the Executive in regulating the military" but noting
that "the role played by those branches does not deny the power and duty of the courts to
protect the constitutional rights of military personnel.").
82. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 112 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that by using "hollow shibboleths about [judicial deference] ... the majority has lost
sight of the fact that 'it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution.'" (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969))).
83. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
84. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 523-24 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 515.
86. See, e.g., id. at 513-14.
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to civilian legal standards, 87 they argue that this alone is not an adequate justification for relinquishing the judicial review function.88
Since the political branches must necessarily accommodate majority
interests, subtler forms of constitutional deprivations affecting minority interests are likely to be glossed over.89 For this reason, it was
decided long ago that the judiciary should be the final arbiter of the
constitutionality of governmental conduct.9
Finally, critics contend that if the separation of powers rationale
for deference is taken literally, then the Court should invoke the political question doctrine and clearly state that there is no judicial
role in this context."' The Court, however, has not gone this far.92
Consequently, the illogical nature of the separation of powers justification for deference is revealed by the Court's unwillingness to adhere to the implications of its own reasoning.
Critics have also taken issue with the separate community argument for deference.93 Some critics argue that the narrower form of
judicial inquiry undertaken when servicemembers assert constitutional claims is inappropriate because it is founded on outdated no87. See Hirschhorn, supra note 2, at 244-45; Zillman & Imwinkelried, Constitutional
Rights and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 396,
400 (1976).
88. See Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 87, at 401; cf. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 523
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[o]ur Nation has preserved freedom of religion, not
through trusting to the good faith of individual agencies of government alone, but through the
constitutionally mandated vigilant oversight and checking authority of the judiciary.").
89. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 523-24 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice
Brennan:
"The concept of military necessity is seductively broad," and military decisionmakers themselves are as likely to succumb to its allure as are the courts and
the general public. Definitions of necessity are influenced by decisionmakers' experiences and values. As a consequence, in pluralistic societies such as ours, institutions
dominated by a majority are inevitably, if inadvertently, insensitive to the needs and
values of minorities when these needs and values differ from those of the majority.
The military, with its strong ethic of conformity and unquestioning obedience, may
be particularly impervious to minority needs and values.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 369 (1980)).
90. See id. at 524.
91. See Note, First Amendment Rights, supra note 18, at 857; cf.Dienes, supra note
18, at 819-20 (commenting that "[t]he deference to other government actors exhibited by the
Supreme Court in the military cases, and the Court's language denigrating the judicial capacity to properly decide issues involving the relation of the military command to its personnel ...
often reflect ...

de facto non-justiciability.").

92. But see infra notes 153-59 (suggesting that the Court may have tacitly concluded
that there is in fact no judicial role in the military context).
93. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (setting forth the separate community
argument).
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tions of the military establishment that no longer comport with real-

ity." Others, such as Justice O'Connor, argue that even assuming
that the majority's view of the military is correct, this still begs the
essential question of what standard of review should be em-

ployed-that the military is different than civilian society should not
in itself lead to the inexorable conclusion that the Court should afford any more deference to the political branches' judgments regarding military needs than that granted in other non-military contexts.95
The argument that the judiciary lacks the competence to adequately balance the needs of military necessity and the rights of ser-

vicemembers' 6 has not garnered much scholarly support.97 Indeed,
one commentator who supports the principle of deference in theory

acknowledges the weakness of this rationale.98 The federal courts are
called upon daily to review intricate and complex controversies."

Often, the extent of the court's technical knowledge is no greater
than that which can be obtained from information provided by the
litigants. Therefore, exactly why the federal courts should be any

less competent in the military context is not readily apparent, and
94. See, e.g., Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 87, at 400. The authors observed:
The "society apart" was a valid description of the small, 19th century regular Army
fighting Indians on the frontier. The description was still largely valid when forces
stood garrison or shipboard duty in the 1930's. But by 1974 the military had become a multimillion-person employer involved in almost every aspect of American
life....
Besides growing in size, the modern military shows increasing signs of "creeping civilianism." Officer Training Programs stress graduate civilian education, foreign affairs study, and managerial technique.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see, e.g., Hirschhorn, supra note 2, at 218-29 (arguing that the
"separate community" remains an apt description of the modern American military community). Certainly, the available statistics seem to belie the notion that our modern military is a
"separate community." As of 1986, approximately 2.2 million Americans served on active duty
in the United States and abroad. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

1988, at 323 (108th ed. 1987). Of those 2.2 million,

about 84% have or are employed in occupations unrelated to combat duty. See M. BINKIN,
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND DEFENSE MANPOWER 6 (1986).
95. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 531 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
see also Dienes, supra note 18, at 826 (arguing that "acceptance of vital, compelling interests
that are often implicated by military regulations does not justify alteration of the standard of
review.").
96. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Dienes, supra note 18, at 820 n.163, 822; Hirschhorn, supra note 2, at 239.
98. See Hirschhorn, supra note 2, at 239 (stating that "there is no basis to conclude that
judges are distinctly less able to comprehend the technical aspects of military discipline than
any other complex scientific or economic issue with which they are presented.").

99. See

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION

§ 33 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing judicial

strategies for the management of complex cases such as antitrust, securities, and employment
litigation).
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the Supreme Court has not attempted to explain its reasoning

further.
Finally, while there has been little commentary on the argument

that the judiciary's alleged incompetence in handling military litigation stems from the grave dangers of judicial error rather than from
inexpertise, 00 that position may be greatly overstated. In theory, a
series of judicial decisions adverse to the balance reached by the political branches may to some extent reduce the effectiveness of a
fighting force. Such an effect, however, is clearly speculative. In fact,
the commentator who has advanced this theory has acknowledged

that even the professional judgments of military experts regarding
"effects of changes in doctrine, discipline, and equipment" are often
"grossly wrong." 10 1 Moreover, in light of the infinite number of factors that combine to make an effective military force, it is difficult to
imagine that judicial invalidation of regulations similar to those
which the Court has upheld will be seriously cited by future historians as a primary or even collateral cause of an American military
defeat.
III. Is THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFERENCE A STANDARD OF REVIEW?
Regardless of whether one deems there to be either constitutional, historical, or logical support for the principle of deference, 0 2
100. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (setting forth this argument).
101. Hirschhorn, supra note 2, at 240.
102. Whether one ultimately believes that a deferential approach to military adjudication is justified is inextricably linked to one's views of the proper relationship between the
judiciary and the political branches of government. It is not the purpose of this Note to argue
that one position is inherently superior to the other. The limited purpose of this Note is to
argue for clarity, precision, and consistency in judicial analysis, which, it is argued, is noticeably absent in the Court's principle of deference cases.
The most comprehensive examinations of what the proper standard of review should be
are those of James M. Hirschhorn, Hirschhorn, supra note 2, and C. Thomas Dienes, Dienes,
supra note 18. According to Hirschhorn, "the courts should not find military departures from
civilian standards of individual rights within the armed forces to be unconstitutional unless
manifestly irrational in terms of successful military performance." Hirschhorn, supra note 2,
at 246. In assessing rationality, Hirshhorn contends that the proper scope of judicial inquiry
depends on whether the challenged military rule has been enacted by Congress or by one of
the branches of the armed services. Id. With respect to challenges to congressional enactments,
Hirschhorn reasons that given the particular competence of Congress and the corresponding
incompetence of the judiciary to reach a proper constitutional balance, the judicial role must
be very narrow. Id. at 241-51. Thus, Hirschhorn argues that:
the reviewing court has but three roles to play: to determine that congressional judgment has been exercised, to confine the power of Congress to deal with constitutional liberties in a utilitarian way to its proper sphere, and to prevent utilitarian
decisions from being made on the basis of a defective process of representation.
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if one is to accept the Supreme Court's initial premises 0 3 to be more
than mere perfunctory assertions, then the Court must translate its

deferential principles into some guiding standard of review so that
lower federal courts can rationally assess whether a military regula-

tion infringes upon a servicemember's constitutional rights. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has provided little helpful insight into the

appropriate judicial methodology for distinguishing a constitutional
from an unconstitutional military regulation. As a result, lower federal courts, as well as servicemembers contemplating litigation, are
confronted with the futile task of sifting through the Court's eloquent assertions regarding the need for heightened deference to discern the seeds of a guiding standard of review. 10
At most, all that can be gleaned from the various principle of
deference cases is that the Court's constitutional review of military

regulations "is far more deferential than constitutional review of
Id. at 248. Accordingly, under this construction, the judiciary's only role would be to ensure
that the political process which enacted the regulation was functioning properly.
With respect to regulations promulgated by one of the branches of the armed forces,
Hirschhorn leaves more room for judicial review because in his opinion "the armed forces are
not necessarily rational self-critics." Id. at 247. Consequently, the reviewing court:
should insist on an explanation, in the light of the criticisms raised by the serviceman, of the need served and how the practice relates to it. The burden of persuasion
would remain on the serviceman, but the armed forces would have to provide a
rational articulation of the usefulness of the practice.
Id.
Professor Dienes rejects Hirschhorn's rationality approach. Dienes argues that
"[rationality review has become essentially no judicial scrutiny at all: the test today is largely
outcome determinative, with the first amendment challenge being rejected." Dienes, supra
note 18, at 833. Instead, Dienes argues for, at least in the first amendment context, "a methodology of weighted judicial interest-balancing with a preference or presumption in favor of first
amendment expression." Id. at 785. Dienes further argues that "[oinly such adherence to a
system of weighted interest balancing . . . can properly respect first amendment values burdened by government regulation and at the same time allow government to protect its vital
interests by means of narrowly drawn regulations." Id.
Thus, Dienes adopts the position articulated by Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion
in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 528-33 (1986), namely, that "the test that one can
glean from this Court's decisions in the civilian context is sufficiently flexible to take into
account the special importance of defending our Nation without abandoning completely the
freedoms that make it worth defending." Dienes, supra note 18, at 826-27 (quoting Goldman,
475 U.S. at 530-31 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting)); see supra note 95 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Goldman).
103. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (observing that the Supreme Court consistently asserts that individuals do not lose the protections of the Bill of Rights upon entry
into the armed forces).
104. See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion in the
lower courts resulting from the Supreme Court's failure to articulate a specific standard of
review).
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similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society."' 0 5 As a
brief survey of the major principle of deference cases reveals, however, the Court refuses to delineate exactly how much more deferential that standard of review is. 1 6
In Parkerv. Levy,10 7 Army captain Howard Levy was convicted
by a general court martial for, inter alia, "conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman,"108 and engaging in behavior "to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces."1 9 Subsequently, Levy was sentenced to "dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for three years at
hard labor."' 10 The conduct that formed the basis of Levy's conviction was a series of public statements in which Levy assailed the
American role in Vietnam and urged black soldiers that "they
should refuse to go to Vietnam and if sent should refuse to fight." '
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Levy argued that two of the
statutes under which he was convicted were void for vagueness in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment and
overbroad under the first amendment." 2 With respect to the vagueness challenge, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, concluded that "[b]ecause of the factors differentiating military society
from civilian society," the appropriate standard for reviewing the
challenged statutes was "the standard which applies to criminal statutes regulating economic affairs. ' ' 11 Applying that standard, the
Court concluded that the statutes passed constitutional muster because Levy could not have had a reasonable doubt that his statements were within the scope of conduct made punishable by the
4
statutes.1
The Court then examined Levy's first amendment claim. " 5 Justice Rehnquist initially noted that in the first amendment area there
is an exception from the traditional rule "that a person to whom a
105. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (emphasis added).
106. See infra notes 121-44 and accompanying text.
107. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
108. Id. at 737-38; see Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933
(1982).
109. Levy, 417 U.S. at 737-38; see Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 134, 10
U.S.C. § 934 (1982).
110. Levy, 417 U.S. at 733.
111. Id. at 736-37.
112. Id. at 752.
113. Id. at 756.
114. Id. at 756-57.
115. See id. at 757-61.
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statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge
the statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in other situations not before the Court.""'
Accordingly, at the time of Levy, it was a well established principle
of first amendment jurisprudence that civilian litigants could challenge overbroad statutes without "demonstrat[ing] that [their] own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite
narrow specificity.""'
Nonetheless, the Court reasoned that because of the military's
unique role within our governmental structure," 8 members of the
military do not have standing to challenge overbroad statutes that
are constitutional with respect to their own particular conduct. 9 In
this regard, the Court noted that Levy's public statements were "unprotected under the most expansive notions of the First
Amendment."' 2 o
What is particularly significant about Levy for the purposes of
this Note is that it represents one of the few instances in which the
Court has furnished a clear and unequivocal statement of the appropriate standard for reviewing servicemembers' constitutional claims.
While one might disagree with the Court's analysis, the articulated
standard of review is, at least, decipherable. It is unfortunate that
the Court, in addressing subsequent constitutional claims of servicemembers, has not acted with comparable precision.
The Court's next opportunity to discuss the appropriate standard for reviewing constitutional challenges in the military context
was in Schlesinger v. Ballard.2 ' In Ballard,a Navy lieutenant challenged a congressional statute that subjected male naval officers to
mandatory discharge if they failed for a second time to be selected
for a promotion to lieutenant commander. 2' Ballard claimed that
the exemption of women from this mandatory discharge provision 2 '
constituted a violation of his right to equal protection of the laws. 2 4
116. Id. at 759.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 760.
119. Id. at 760-61.
120. Id. at 761.
121. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
122. Id. at 499-500; see 10 U.S.C. § 6382 (repealed 1980).
123. See 10 U.S.C. § 6382(d) (repealed 1980) (providing that "[tihis section does not
apply to women officers ... or to officers designated for limited duty."). Instead, women officers were subjected to 10 U.S.C. § 6401, which required discharge for want of promotion
only after 13 years of active commissioned service. See 10 U.S.C. § 6401 (repealed 1980).
124. See Ballard, 419 U.S. at 500. Ballard's claim was that "the application of § 6382
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Although the Court did not clearly specify what level of scrutiny
should be used in resolving gender-based equal protection claims
brought by members of the military, the Court apparently adopted a
rational relation test, stating, "Congress may thus quite rationally
have believed that women line officers had less opportunity for promotion than did their male counterparts, and that a longer period of
tenure for women officers would, therefore, be consistent with the
goal to provide women officers with 'fair and equitable career advancement programs.' "125
to him, when compared with the treatment of women officers subject to § 6401, was an unconstitutional discrimination based on sex in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." Id.
125. Id. at 508 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 216, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967)) (emphasis
added). Under the traditional formulation of this standard of review, "[u]nless a classification
trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as
race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest." New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Furthermore, legislation is
not unconstitutional "simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety
or because in practice it results in some inequality.' . . . [The rational basis standard] is true to
the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose
upon the states their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy." Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970) (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
While the rational relation standard of review "is not a toothless one," Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976), it is an inherently deferential standard in which the ultimate "burden rests on those challenging a legislative classification to demonstrate that it does not bear
the 'fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation' required under the Constitution." United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183-84 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The difficult burden imposed on plaintiffs by the rational relation standard is reflected in the fact that Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), was the first
case in 25 years in which the Supreme Court, applying the rational relation test, held that a
plaintiff's right to equal protection of the laws had been violated. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR,
J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1148 (6th ed. 1986). Recent Supreme Court
decisions suggest that the Court may be moving toward a rational relation standard with more
judicial "bite" than previously afforded. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a prison regulation that prohibited inmates from marrying other inmates or civilians
unless the prison superintendent found compelling reasons for permitting the marriage was not
rationally related to a legitimate penological interest); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470
U.S. 869 (1985) (holding that a state tax that was more burdensome on out-of-state insurance
companies did not advance a legitimate state purpose); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that a city zoning ordinance that required a special
use permit for homes for the mentally retarded was not rationally related to a legitimate state
interest); Hooper v. Bernalillo, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (holding that a state statute that provided
a property exemption to Vietnam veterans but only if the veteran became a state resident
before a certain date was not rationally related to the asserted state interest); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (holding that a state statutory scheme that distributed earnings
from natural resource development on the basis of citizens' length of residence was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (holding
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In Brown v. Glines, 28 Albert Glines, a captain in the Air Force
Reserves, claimed that Air Force regulations requiring servicemembers to secure approval from their commanders prior to dis12 7
tributing petitions on the base violated the first amendment.
Under the regulations, the base commander could prohibit the distribution of petitions if he determined that "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of members of the Armed Forces, or material interference with the accomplishment of a military mission
would result. ' 28 Upon making such a finding, the base commander
was then obligated to inform his superiors of that determination.12 9
However, the base commander could not prohibit the distribution or
posting of materials simply because they were critical of Government
policies or officials.' 30 Moreover, "distribution of publications and
other materials through the United States mail" was not prohibited. " ' Finally, the regulations charged the base commanders with
the affirmative obligation of "encourag[ing] and promot[ing] the
availability to service personnel of books, periodicals, and other media which present a wide range of viewpoints on public issues.
In upholding the regulations, the Court expressed what appeared to be a clear and workable standard for reviewing Glines'
first amendment challenge, namely, that the "regulations

. .'.

protect

a substantial Government interest unrelated to the suppression of
free expression' 33 and limit "speech
no more than is reasonably
34
necessary" to further that interest.'
The Court's opinion, however, is problematic for several reasons. First, the Court did not indicate whether its articulated standard of review was to be the definitive standard for reviewing all
subsequent first amendment challenges to military regulations. Inthat a state statute that required appellants in landlord-tenant disputes to file a double bond
was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest). But see Barret, The Rational Basis
Standardfor Equal Protection Review of Ordinary Legislative Classifications, 68 Ky. LJ.

845, 878 (1980) (arguing that "the use by courts of judicial review to push for legislative
processes which are more 'rational' and 'efficient' can serve only to distort further the political

process .... ).
126.
127.

444 U.S. 348 (1980).
Id. at 349.

128. Id. at 350 (quoting Air Force Reg. 35-15(3)(a)(2) (1970)).
129. Id. at 356.
130.

Id. at 355.

131.

Id. at 355-56 (quoting Air Force Reg. 35-15(3)(a)(1) (1970)).

132.
133.

Id. at 350 n.2 (quoting Air Force Reg. 35-15(3)(a)(5) (1970)).
Id. at 354.

134. Id. at 355.
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stead, the Court simply began and ended its constitutional analysis
by stating that the "regulations . . . protect a substantial Govern-

ment interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression,"'' 5 and
did not discuss how the Court arrived at this standard or the scope of
its future applicability. Furthermore, in applying its adopted standard of review, the Court did not define the factors that are relevant
in determining whether the government's interest is "substantial"
and "unrelated to the suppression of free speech" or when the regulations restrict "speech no more than is reasonably necessary." Finally, the Court did not analyze how the burdens of proof were allocated between the government and the servicemember. Accordingly,
while Glines seemed to express a meaningful standard for reviewing
first amendment challenges to military regulations, it in fact represented a significant analytical regression from the Court's earlier dei 6
cision in Parker v. Levy. 1
This regression continued in the Court's next principle of deference case, Rostker v. Goldberg.137 Golberg was a class action
brought on behalf of "all male persons who [were] registered or subject to registration .

. .

for training and service in the armed

forces," 1 a challenging the constitutionality of the Military Selective
Service Act (MSSA)."39 The plaintiffs claimed that section 453 of
the MSSA, providing for registration of all males but not females, 140
violated their right to equal protection of the laws.' 4 The Court, in a
6-3 opinion, ultimately concluded that this provision of the MSSA
did not deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection.'42
135. Id. at 354.
136. 417 U.S. 733 (1974), discussed supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
137. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
138. Id. at 62.
139. Ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
140. Id. § 3, 62 Stat. at 605 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 453 (1982)).
141. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 61 n.2. The Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment has
been interpreted to "incorporate" the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Court in Boiling stated:
The Fifth Amendment ... does not contain an equal protection clause as does the
Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of
prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply
that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized,
discrimination may be so unjusifiable as to be violative of due process.
Id. at 499.
142. See Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 83. The majority noted that:
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What is particularly striking about the Goldberg opinion is that
in response to the Solicitor General's request that the Court adopt
the more deferential "rational relation" standard of review as opposed to the more heightened level of scrutiny generally employed in
gender-based discrimination cases, 143 the Court expressly declined to
adopt any definitive standard for reviewing the plaintifPs claims,
stating:
We do not think that the substantive guarantee of due process or
certainty in the law will be advanced by any further "refinement"
in the applicable tests as suggested by the Government. Announced
degrees of "deference" to legislative judgments, just as levels of
"scrutiny" which this Court announces that it applies to particular
classifications made by a legislative body may all too readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result .... Simply labeling the legislative decision "military" on the one hand or "genderbased" on the other does not automatically guide a court to the
correct constitutional result.'
The irony of the Court's assertion is that while the Court was
castigating the Government for its "facile abstractions," its refusal
to establish a clear standard of review left unanswered the question
of what should guide a court to a "correct constitutional result."
Consequently, Goldberg, if anything, only added to the growing confusion regarding the appropriate standard of review in the military
context.
The confusion produced by the Court's principle of deference
opinions is clearly evident in the lower courts where judges have
struggled to make sense of the mixed signals which the Supreme
[t]he reason women are exempt from registration is not because military needs can
be met by drafting men. This is not a case of Congress arbitrarily choosing to burden one of two similarly situated groups, such as would be the case with an all-black
or all-white, or an all-Catholic or all-Lutheran, or an all-Republican or all-Democratic registration. Men and women, because of the combat restrictions on women,
are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft.
Congress' decision to authorize the registration of only men, therefore, does not
violate the Due Process Clause. The exemption of women from registration is not
only sufficiently related, but also closely related, to Congress' purpose in authorizing
registration.
Id. at 78-79.
143. See id. at 69. Under the heightened standard, "[t]o withstand scrutiny under the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause, 'classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.'" Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (quoting
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
144. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 69-70.
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Court's opinions convey. Applying the test enunciated by the Fifth
Circuit in Mindes v. Seaman,4 5 five circuit courts 46 and three district courts 4 presently undertake a pre-merit assessment of servicemembers' constitutional claims to determine whether the claims
should be dismissed even before considering the underlying substantive issues. 148 The Mindes test requires a court to balance the following factors to determine whether it should proceed to evaluate the

substantive merits of the constitutional challenge: "(1) [t]he nature
and strength of the plaintiff's challenge to the military determination. . . . (2) [t]he potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused ....(3) [t]he type and degree of anticipated interference with
the military function. . . .[and] (4) [t]he extent to which the exer-

cise of military expertise or discretion is involved.' 49
Two circuit courts have expressly rejected the Mindes test and
ostensibly undertake some form of review. 50 Finally, one recent decision by the Ninth Circuit, Watkins v. United States Army,' 5 ' while
apparently acknowledging the principle of deference, applied the

same standard of review otherwise applicable
in the civilian context
52
for evaluating equal protection claims.1
145. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
146. See Khalsa v. Weinberger, 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1986); Rucker v. Secretary of
the Army, 702 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1983); Niezner v. Mark, 684 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); Lindenau v. Alexander, 663 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1981);
West v. Brown, 558 F.2d 757 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1977).
While never formally adopting the Mindes test, the Second Circuit undertakes a similar
balancing analysis. See, e.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985); Crawford v.
Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976).
147. benShalom v. Marsh, 690 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Wis. 1988); Williams v. United
States, 541 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D.N.C. 1982); Cushing v. Tetter, 478 F. Supp. 960 (D.R.I.
1979).
148. Cf. Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84
COLuM. L. REV. 387, 389 (1984) (authored by Gabriel W. Gorenstein) (arguing that "the use
of [the Mindes] balancing test to determine a court's power to review a constitutional claim
against the military is not justified.").
149. Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201-02.
150. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Dillard v. Brown, 652
F.2d 316 (3rd Cir. 1981).
151. 857 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988).
152. See id. at 1448. In Watkins, an Army sergeant challenged an Army regulation
which disqualified all homosexuals from Army service irrespective of the length or quality of
their prior military service. Id. at 1429. Among other claims, Watkins argued that the regulation violated his right to equal protection under the fifth amendment by discriminating against
him based on his sexual orientation. Id. at 1435. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the regulation violated Watkins' right to equal protection of the law. Id. at
1451. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit reached the following conclusions: that the regulation
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, id. at 1436; that homosexuals were a suspect
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WATERSHED CASE?

The most recent, and perhaps most significant, principle of deference case is Goldman v. Weinberger.153 Simcha Goldman, an orthodox Jew, ordained rabbi, and Air Force captain, claimed that an
Air Force regulation that prohibited him from wearing a yarmulke
while on duty violated the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment."' In a 5-4 opinion, the Court held that the challenged regulation "reasonably and evenhandedly regulate[d] dress in the interest
of the military's perceived need for uniformity" and therefore did
55
not violate the first amendment.1
On the surface, the Court's holding that the regulations were
reasonable and even-handed might suggest a real, albeit deferential,
standard of review. Other language in the opinion, however, undermines this conclusion. Although the Court adhered to its prior assumptions that servicemembers do not relinquish the protections of
the Bill of Rights upon entry into the military and that the judiciary
class, id. at 1448; that the challenged regulation was subject to strict judicial scrutiny, id.; and
that the regulation was not "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest," id. at
1451.
Although both the majority and dissenting opinions provided exhaustive analysis of
whether Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), precluded Watkins' equal protection
claim, surprisingly, neither opinion emphasized the special importance of the military context
of the asserted constitutional challenge. This is especially puzzling given that the Ninth Circuit has expressly adopted the Mindes test. See supra note 146.
153. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). For discussion of Congressional attempts to protect soldiers'
religious rights after Goldman, see Sullivan, The Congressional Response to Goldman v.
Weinberger, 121 MIL. L. REV. 725 (1988).
154. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 504. Goldman was stationed at March Air Force Base where
he served from 1977 through 1981 as a clinical psychologist at the Air Force Regional Hospital. Id. at 504-05. During this period, Goldman wore a yarmulke upon his head as an expression of his religious faith. Id. at 505. This conduct was never questioned or objected to by
fellow servicemembers or superiors. Id.
Nonetheless, on May 8, 1981, shortly after testifying at an unrelated court martial proceeding as a defense witness, Goldman was informed that the oppposing attorney at the proceeding had filed a complaint against him for wearing a yarmulke while on duty. Id. The
attorney claimed that wearing a yarmulke while on duty violated Air Force regulations. Id.
Goldman was subsequently ordered by the hospital commander to stop wearing the yarmulke
while on duty. Id. Goldman's request to be exempted from the regulation was met with a letter
of reprimand, and a withdrawal of a letter of recommendation for continued active service. Id.
Goldman then brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the enforcement of the Air
Force dress regulation as applied to him. Id. at 506. The district court granted relief to
Goldman, Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 530 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1981), but the D.C.
Circuit reversed, 734 F.2d 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
155. 475 U.S. at 510.
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maintains an essential role in safeguarding these protections, 156 the
Court's holding that the appropriate military decisionmakers "are
under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment"'1 7 is wholly irreconcilable with these assumptions.
If the political branches of government may enact any regulations
that are deemed necessary to promote perceived military objectives
5 then the
without regard for independent constitutional limitations,5'
inexorable conclusion must be that servicemembers have no constitutional rights, and the judiciary, by necessity, has no role to play.
If this is what Goldman signifies, then it would seem that the
Court has finally unearthed that which had remained tenuously below the surface in its previous principle of deference cases; it also
may explain why the Court has refused to articulate a clear and
precise standard of review. On the other hand, this interpretation of
Goldman may not be accurate since, in form, if not in substance, the
Court adhered to its basic analytical framework.15 9 Accordingly,
Goldman, like previous principle of deference cases, fails to provide
any intelligible guidance beyond the confines of the particular facts
of the case for resolving constitutional claims of members of the
armed forces.
V.

CONCLUSION

To say that the Court's military jurisprudence is in need of clarification is, perhaps, an understatement. In the fifteen years since the
Court first expressed the principle of deference in Parkerv. Levy, 60
the Court has repeatedly failed to formulate a clear and coherent
statement of the proper relationship between the political branches
of government and the judiciary in defining servicemembers' constitutional rights.1 6 ' While the implications of some of the statements
in Goldman may suggest that the Court is close to adopting a definitive resolution, namely, that the Bill of Rights are inapplicable to
servicemembers,' 6 ' the Court's continued adherence to its traditional
principle of deference analysis indicates that the Court has not yet
156. Id. at 507.
157. Id. at 509.
158. See, e.g., id.at 509-10.
159. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text (discussing the theoretical bases of

the Court's principle of deference).
160. See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text (discussing Levy).
161.
162.

See supra notes 121-59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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reconciled this constitutional dilemma.16

If the Court's failure to state a standard of review indicates-as
Goldman may suggest-that servicemembers have no Bill of Rights
protections and that the judiciary has no function in this context,
this should be made explicit. If, however, the Court is sincere in its
repeated assertions that the Bill of Rights is applicable to servicemembers and the judiciary does, in fact, maintain an essential
role in protecting those rights, then the Court must formulate and
express a clear standard of review. While reasonable people ultimately may disagree as to whether the adopted standard adequately
reaches the proper balance between military necessity and servicemembers' rights,' 6 4 an intelligible articulation of that standard
would add clarity, precision, and guidance to the Court's present
analysis.
Barney F. Bilello

163. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
164. For discussion of the standard of review proposed by two of the leading commentators in the field, see supra note 102.
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